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Insubordinated *if*-clauses as discourse subordination*

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Abstract
Spanish allows for bare *if*-clauses (BIFs), i.e., *if*-clauses lacking a matrix clause, which display a complex array of meanings different from their stereotypical subordinated counterparts. In this paper I derive their interpretations through discourse-level interactions, building on exhaustivity inferences associated with intonation as well as reasoning familiar from so-called *biscuit conditionals*. The key to the analysis is a dynamic view of context that includes a way of tracking proposals that await evaluation (before, e.g., they are accepted/rejected). The view that Spanish BIFs refer back to content awaiting evaluation allows us to integrate the different ingredients involved in the construction of meaning without ad-hoc theoretical stipulations.

Keywords Insubordination, *if*-clauses, context-update, pragmatics, metalinguistic

1 Adjoined vs bare *if*-clauses

If-clauses in Spanish can appear adjoined to matrix clauses as in (1), just as in English.

(1) Si has terminado los deberes, vas a jugar.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework go.2sg.IND to play
'If you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play.'

(1) is a classical hypothetical *if*-construction, with a *protasis* identified by the *if*-clause and an *apodosis* identified by the matrix clause. Viewed from the perspective of a Lewis/Stalnaker/Kratzer style semantics, the protasis restricts the domain of quantification of the (implicit) modal in the matrix clause (see, e.g., Lewis 1975; Stalnaker 1975; Kratzer 1981, 1986). Roughly, the sentence will be true only if there are relevant worlds in the Stalnakerian context set (*cs*) in which the protasis is true (i.e., the protasis is 'epistemically possible') and, additionally, all such worlds are worlds in which the apodosis is true.[2] (1),

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[2] I assume propositions to be sets of possible worlds. *cs* is the set of worlds in the intersection of the propositions that participants mutually accept as true at a given time in discourse, i.e.

for example, will be true iff the relevant worlds in *cs* in which the addressee finishes their homework are all worlds in which they go out to play.

In colloquial Spanish,[3] *if*-clauses can also appear by themselves (*bare*), (2-3), with two different nuclear contours that play an important role in their overall interpretation: '↑' or rising (2/3-a) and '↓' or falling in (2/3-b);[4] (unless otherwise indicated, tense is in the present):

(2) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
a. Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↑.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈ 'If you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play.'
b. Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↓.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈'Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play.'

(3) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
a. Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↑.
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'If you have an exam tomorrow, you won't go out to play.'
b. Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓.
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'

I use the label BIF to refer to the (syntactic) *Bare If-clauses* in (2) and (3), and I will refer to the associated proposition informally as the *prejacent*. (2) and (3) differ in the perceived relation between the prejacent and the content of the preceding utterance: common assumptions of normalcy lead us to understand that going out to play and having finished one's homework is a normal correlation of facts, (2), whereas going out to play and having an exam the next day is not, (3). While examples in (2) and (3a) are familiar from many languages, (3b) is rather "quirky" in not being associated with a 'conditional'-type interpretation, and it is not equally common (for example, it is not found in English).

(2a) and (3a) display '↑' (BIF↑s), the typical continuation contour found at the end of *if*-clauses syntactically attached to matrix clauses. In both cases we interpret that the speaker has not "completed" the sentence and is inviting the addressee to find the intended missing apodosis. Making stereotypical

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the propositions in the common ground (CG). Note that acceptance is an attitude different from belief.

[3]Examples like (3b) are not common in all Spanish varieties. They are very common in, e.g., Peninsular, Puerto Rican and Colombian Spanish, but not in, e.g., Rioplatense or Ecuadorian Spanish (see ftn. 24 and 15 for varieties requiring *pero* ('but') preceding these clauses and its licensing). The data in this paper is from Peninsular Spanish.

[4]See Elvira García et al. (2017) for an overview of the prosody in these environments. The final fall can have different realizations: L*HL%, L+H*L%, L*L% in Sp_ToBI (Hualde and Prieto, 2015). This is also the case for a final rise, which can be L+H*H%, H*H%, L+H*!HH% or L*H%.

assumptions regarding how the world works, in (2a) this continuation would be 'you'll go out to play', while in (3a) it would likely be the opposite, 'you won't go out to play'. The interpretation process is the same: in recovering a missing apodosis we look for one that is in a (conditional) dependence relation with the prejacent (see §3.1) leading to a hypothetical-conditional reading.

In the case of BIFs with '↓' (BIF↓), however, there is a stark difference between (2b) and (3b). Descriptively, in (2b) the interpretation appears to be one in which we recover a missing apodosis from the previous discourse. In this sense, as in the previous cases, the interpretation is somehow "elliptical": taking the BIF↓ together with the previous utterance, we recover a full *if*-construction similar to *if you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play*, but the interpretation is now strengthened. With '↓', in (2b), the mother is explicitly conveying that only if the addressee finishes their homework will they go out to play (contrast with (2a)).[5] In this way, the prejacent provides not only sufficient conditions for the truth of the (recovered) apodosis, but also necessary conditions ('iff'). This strengthening is similar to what has been called in the literature *conditional perfection* (Geis and Zwicky, 1971), and I will refer to it as an *exhaustivity inference*.

In contrast with(2b), our quirky (3b) doesn't have a conditional interpretation. It is stereotypically interpreted as conveying that the prejacent, i.e. that the kid has an exam the following day, has already been accepted as true. In terms of *cs*, as I'll show, the prejacent is presupposed. The BIF↓ in (3b) is used to raise awareness of properties of the context that would result from accepting the kid's assertion. In particular, it highlights that the context updated with the information that the kid is going out to play is also a context in which they have an exam the following day. This is an anomalous correlation of facts. Intuitively, the effect is somewhat similar to what the mother would achieve with the metalinguistic claim *You are telling me that you are going out to play while having an exam tomorrow*, and my analysis will capture this parallelism (contrary to a metalinguistic claim, however, BIF↓s are not assertions). In a stereotypical context in which the two facts are not expected to hold together, the mother is taken to express that she is not inclined to accept (/is resisting, Bledin and Rawlins 2019) the kid's proposal that the common ground be updated to include that they are going out to play. The utterance may be optionally accompanied by prosodic features further signaling the speaker's surprise, marked with '?!', although this is not necessary. I will use the label Res_{BIF} for the resistance interpretation of BIF↓s. Paraphrases are often elusive but I will provide the closest one in each case. Notice that (2b) is not resisting in exactly the same way. In (2b) the mother conveys a sort of conditional acceptance of the kid's proposal. For convenience, to contrast this BIF↓-interpretation with Res_{BIF}s, I will call it Non-R(esisting)B(are)IF(-clause) (Non-Res_{BIF}).

[5] Further strengthening could be derived contextually in (2a), as with regular *if*-constructions; see von Fintel 2001.

Previous analyses of Spanish BIF↓s characterize them as Res_{BIF}s across the board. As Res_{BIF}s, the semantics of BIF↓s has been treated as fundamentally different from regular *if*-clauses, and their overall meaning has been taken to be the result of a historical process in Spanish ending in reanalysis as main clauses, i.e., a case of *insubordination* (see, e.g., Schwenter 2016a,b; see §2.1).[6] While Non-Res_{BIF}s have been recognized, they have been analyzed as syntactically elliptical clauses (and thus not really BIF↓s). In this paper I argue that Res_{BIF}- and Non-Res_{BIF}-interpretations are derived from a unified semantics, which is related to that of adjoined *if*-clauses. Semantically, I argue that BIF↓s are *if*-clauses that recover an apodosis from the immediately preceding context, and that the choice of '↓' over '↑' matters (the main focus of this paper will be on BIF↓s).

In my analysis, differences between Non-Res_{BIF}s and Res_{BIF}s are pragmatic, with a key role played by the relation between the prejacent and the recovered apodosis. The crucial question is whether or not they can be taken to (conditionally) depend on each other in *cs*. That is: when the truth of the prejacent and the recovered apodosis is undecided, are we willing to accept, e.g., that learning the truth of the prejacent leads us to learn the truth of the apodosis, or, e.g., that learning the falsehood of the apodosis leads us to learn the falsehood of the prejacent? The issue of acceptable (conditional) dependencies has been studied in the pragmatic literature on Austinian *biscuit conditionals* (e.g., *if you are hungry, there are biscuits on the table*) in relation to their contrast with *hypothetical conditionals* (e.g., *if it rains, we'll cancel the picnic*). I show that the mechanisms at play delivering differences between Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s are the same as those already familiar from that literature.

More broadly, BIF↓s support the claim that differences in the interpretation of *if*-constructions are tied to the (in)dependence presuppositions that participants should maintain in *cs* throughout the update process (see Franke 2009; Biezma and Goebel 2023). While this has been the focus of much work on biscuit conditionals, the study of BIF↓s in Spanish lends independent support to the underlying idea that often times it is our assumptions regarding what is possible in the update process that leads to different interpretations, and that such differences do not need to be encoded ad-hoc in the syntax/semantics.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in §2 I provide an in depth overview of the properties of BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s. In §3 I turn to Non-Res_{BIF}s and compare them with Res_{BIF}s. The aim is to provide unified analysis of Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s deriving their similarities and their differences. In §4 I provide such analysis, and in §5 I conclude with a look ahead and some typological considerations.

[6] This paper is part of a larger project on insubordination with Spanish data as its empirical domain. See Biezma (2025) for insubordinated *that*-clauses.

2 Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s: The quirky BIF↓s

In this section I provide a thorough description of the data that any account of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s has to explain, and that are challenging for a proposal aiming at a unified analysis of BIF↓s similar to adjoined *if*-clauses. In §2.1 I overview differences between BIF↓s interpreted as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s and adjoined *if*-clauses. These observations were mainly made in Schwenter (2016a,b), who concluded that since BIF↓s did not behave as adjoined *if*-clauses, this must be because they have different syntax/semantics, and that BIF↓s are main clauses (note that Schwenter et seq. consider Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s as the result of a completely different syntax-semantics from Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, the latter being merely elliptical *if*-clauses; I turn to BIF↓s as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s in §3). In §2.2 I further scrutinize the meaning of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s and show that, contra previous claims (e.g., Schwenter 2016a), BIF↓s interpreted as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s presuppose their prejacent. I also argue that Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s always present objections to the preceding context-update proposal, although not necessarily to its content.

2.1 Comparing BIF↓s as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$*s* with adjoined *if*-clauses

In this section I review observations made by Schwenter regarding the contrast in behavior between BIF↓s as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s and adjoined *if*-clauses with respect to (i) (post-nominal) NPIs; (ii) coordination; (iii) embeddability and (iv) sentence-level adverbials.

"Regular" *if*-clauses are known to provide a downward entailing context and, hence, to license NPIs. However, as shown by the contrast between (4) and (5) from Schwenter (2016a), Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s do not accept postnominal NPIs. As illustrated, the licensing of the NPIs (e.g., *alguna*) requires negation (paraphrases in Schwenter's examples are my own):

(4) Si tienes duda alguna, me puedes llamar.
if have.2sg.IND doubt any cl.1sg.DAT can.2sg.IND call.Inf
'If you have any doubt, you can call me.'

(5) A: Tienes dudas sobre mi lealtad, ¿no?
'You have doubts about my loyalty, right?'
B: Si yo *(no) tengo duda alguna↓.
if I neg have.1sg.IND doubt any
Available with negation: ≈'(How can you say that I have doubts) despite me not having any doubts?!'

As Schwenter implies, prenominal-*alguna* is fine in Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, as we can see in (6) (I return to the difference with postnominals in §4.3):

(6) A is agonizing about the decision to get married:
A: Well..., I guess I'll get married.
B: Si tienes alguna duda↓. No puedes casarte así. [Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND any doubt neg can get married so
≈'Despite having doubts?! You can't get married that way.'

Turning to (ii), coordination, Schwenter (2016a) points out that unlike adjoined *if*-clauses, (7), Res_{BIF}s can't be coordinated, (8):

(7) Si sigues asistiendo a clase y si estudias mucho, vas a llegar lejos.
'If you keep attending class and if you study a lot, you will go far.'

(8) A: Julia no va a aprobar el examen.
'Julia won't pass the test.'
B: ¡Si ha estudiado mucho y (*si) lo sabe todo↓!
if has studied a lot and if cl.3sg.ACC knows all
Intended: 'Despite having studied so much and knowing all the material?!'

Regarding (iii), embeddability, Schwenter (2016a) (ex. (9a,c)) shows that, unlike Res_{BIF}s, *if*-constructions can be embedded under verba dicendi or attitude predicates:

(9) Juan cree/dice que si tenemos dinero compraremos un coche nuevo.
John believes/says that if have.1pl money will buy a car new
'Juan thinks/says that if we have money we'll buy a new car.'

(10) A: Vamos a comprar un coche nuevo.
'Let's buy a new car.'
B_1: *¡Juan cree/dice que si no tenemos dinero↓!
John believes/says.3sg.IND that if neg have.1pl.IND money
B_2: ¡Si Juan dice que no tenemos dinero↓!
if John says that neg have.1pl.IND money
≈'Despite John saying that we have no money?!'

Finally, with respect to (iv), sentence-level adverbs, Schwenter's (2016a) observation is that they can't scope over Res_{BIF}s:

(11) Obviamente, si no vienen, no habrá fiesta.
Obviously if not come.3pl.PRES.IND not be.3sg.FUT.IND party
'Obviously, if they don't come, there won't be a party.'

(12) A: ¿Va a haber fiesta?
'Is there going to be a party?'
B_1: ¡Si obviamente no vienen↓!
si obviously neg come.3pl.IND
≈'Despite people obviously not coming?!'
B_2: *Obviamente si no vienen.
obviously if neg come.3pl.IND

Schwenter's conclusion from the contrasts shown above is that since Res_{BIF}s do not behave like regular adjoined *if*-clauses, it must be because they are different from adjoined *if*-clauses and are, then, main clauses. Their overall

interpretation as Res_{BIF}s is the result of conventionalization of matrix-less *if*-clauses with indicative mood.[7]

(13) summarizes the differences between BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s vs adjoined *if*-clauses.

(13)

	adjunct *if*-clause	BIF↓(as Res_{BIF}s)
post-Nom NPI	✓	X
Coordination	✓	X
Embeddability	✓	X
Sentence-level adverb	✓	X

2.2 Contrasts in the interpretation

The differences between Res_{BIF}s and regular *if*-clauses sketched in §2.1 open the door to analyses in which Res_{BIF}s are the result of conventionalization. Schwenter (2016b, pg. 28) himself proposes an analysis in which *si* in Res_{BIF}s is a discourse marker "indicating that the truth of the [prejacent] is obvious to the speaker and shared in the [C(ommon)G(round)]".[8] However, Schwenter does not characterize BIF↓s as conventionalizing that the prejacent is presupposed. He argues instead that BIF↓s are "strong assertions that typically position the utterer as in possession of knowledge that their interlocutor does not (yet) have, or has forgotten, or does not consider relevant to the topic at hand" (Schwenter 2016b, pg. 29). The meaning of *si* in these cases, Schwenter argues, conveys that the prejacent is *obviously* true. In what follows I examine these claims and show that (i) Res_{BIF}s convey the truth of the prejacent but (ii) it cannot be new information: the prejacent is presupposed (already entailed by *cs*), not just "obvious" to the speaker; (iii) Res_{BIF}s are always objections; (iv) cannot be used as direct answers, and (v) while the prejacent can be claimed to be false, Res_{BIF}s do not accept sentential negation. When relevant, I also compare BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s with declaratives, the syntactic form whose canonical sentential force is to add information to *cs*, i.e., assertions (whether or not they indicate that the content is "obvious"). The conclusion is that BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s are not assertions (strong or otherwise).

To see that BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s convey the truth of the prejacent, (i), let us contrast the *if*-construction in (14) with the BIF↓ in (15). (Unless otherwise indicated, all contexts below are such that participants share

[7] Notice, however, that there are BIF↓s with subjunctive mood interpreted as Res_{BIF}s:

(i) A: I should have bought more artichokes at the supermarket.
B: Si no hubieras tenido dinero↓. (Sólo te di €10.)
if neg had.2sg.SUBJ got money only cl.2sg.DAT gave.1sg €10
≈'Despite you not having enough money?! I only gave you €10.'

Just as in (3b), the BIF↓ in (iB) is stereotypically interpreted as presupposing its prejacent (it is mutually accepted that they would have not had enough money) and as resisting the previous utterance (here an objection to the addressee considering it a failure on their part not to have bought more artichokes), matters that will be discussed below. Introducing the formal apparatus to deal with the subjunctive, however, is beyond the scope this paper and the added complications don't contribute anything to the paper's main point. Thus, I leave them aside.

[8] This analysis is parallel to analyses of German *ja* in the literature (see Zimmermann 2011).

stereotypical assumptions of normalcy, e.g., that having and exam next day defeasibly entails spending the afternoon studying.[9])

(14) A mother and her kid are discussing whether she will give the kid a ride to school the next day or whether they'll take public transportation:

Kid: Pleaasseee..., it'll be stressful riding the bus right before an exam.
Mom: Vale, si tienes un examen mañana, pero todavía puede
ok if have.2sg.IND a esam tomorrow but still can.3sg
que no lo tengas, te llevo en coche.
that neg cl.3sg have.2sg.IND cl.2sg take.1sg.IND in car
'Ok, if you have an exam tomorrow, although it may still be that you don't have one, I'll give you a ride.'

(15) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'
Mom (continued): #Pero todavía puede que no lo tengas.
'Although it may still be that you don't have one.'

In (14) the mother can claim that having an exam tomorrow is a live possibility (encoded in the meaning of indicative conditionals) while also accepting that not having an exam is also a live alternative (as made explicit in the parenthetical). However, the BIF↓ in (15), a Res_{BIF}, requires that the speaker already accepts the prejacent as true, as shown by the infelicity of the continuation in (15). One could think that this makes Res_{BIF}s similar to plain declaratives. However, Res_{BIF}s require even stronger licensing conditions. Res_{BIF}s convey that the prejacent is already mutually accepted by speaker and addressee ((ii) above):

(16) A: Since you don't have to prepare for school tomorrow, mow the lawn.
B: Si tengo un examen mañana↓.
if have.1sg.IND an exam tomorrow
(i) #... No lo sabes porque me olvidé decírtelo.
'You don't know about the exam because I forgot to tell you.'
(ii) ✓... Te lo confirmé ayer!
'I confirmed it to you yesterday.'

[9]The notion of defeasible entailment (a non-monotonic entailment) is used to account for cases in which "the relationship of support between premises and conclusion is a tentative one, potentially defeated by additional information" (Koons 2017). It is usually illustrated with the 'Tweety example': If one learns that Tweety is a bird, one may infer that Tweety flies, an inference that is defeated by the information that Tweety is a penguin. (N.b.: penguins are birds that, unlike most birds, can't fly.) Defeasible entailment is under debate in the literature, but it has been very useful in capturing our intuitions with respect to 'normality' (see e.g. Chisolm 1957; McCarthy and Hayes 1969; Asher and Lascarides 2003; Eckardt 2020). The informal definition in (i) is from Lascarides and Asher (1993):

(i) $p > q$ (p defeasibly entails q) means *if p then normally q*.

The contrast in felicity of the continuations (16i)-(16ii) shows that the Res_{BIF} is only felicitous if the prejacent is taken to be already mutually accepted. This discussion seems to go counter the claim that Res_{BIF}s can provide new information, as Schwenter (2016b) argues on the basis of (17) (Schwenter's 2016b ex. (19b), pg. 8):

(17) A: Marta will surely come to class tomorrow.
B: Si está en Italia↓.
if is in Italy
≈ 'Despite being in Italy?!'

Schwenter points out that B's utterance conveys "the message that A is "out of the loop" about Marta". Notice, however, that (17B) is not possible if B assumes that A is completely ignorant of Marta's absence. In fact, (17B) can be followed up by the Spanish equivalent to *you are supposed to know that (already)* but *there is no reason to think you knew that* would be infelicitous. Likewise, (18B') is infelicitous in a context in which it is mutually accepted that A doesn't know about the call:[10]

(18) B': #Si me acaba de llamar para decirme que se va hoy de
if cl.1sg finish of call to say that cl.3sg go.3sg today of
sorpresa a Italia.
surprise to Italy
≈ 'Despite having just phoned me to say that she is unexpectedly on her way to Italy?!'

In fact, A could expose the inadequacy of (18B') by responding *how was I supposed to know that?*. Crucially, this protest wouldn't be an acceptable response to the parallel regular declarative (*si*-less utterance).

From this discussion we can conclude that the Res_{BIF} interpretation of BIF↓s includes that participants already mutually accept the prejacent, or should be able to easily accommodate it: Schwenter's intuition that (17B) conveys that A is "out of the loop" is really B signaling that A should already have accepted that Marta is in Italy, i.e., the speaker takes this to be already entailed by *cs* and, hence, not to be news.

Regarding (iii), i.e. that Res_{BIF}s are always objections, we mentioned above that these BIF↓s are interpreted as objections to the preceding context-update proposal. Notice that the objection doesn't need to be about their content:

(19) A: Te tengo que contar una cosa: ¡Morgan está de sabático el próximo semestre!
'I have to tell you this: Morgan is on sabbatical next semester!'

[10] For readability and space reasons, when providing follow ups or preceding contexts to given utterances I offer mostly only the English paraphrases.

B: Ya lo sabía. Si está de sabático cada dos por tres↓.
already cl.ACC knew.1sg if is of sabbatical each two by three
¿De qué te sorprendes?
of what cl.2sg surprise
'I already knew. (You seem surprised) despite Morgan being on sabbatical more often than not?! Why are you surprised?'

(19B) agrees with the content of the previous utterance but objects to A considering it newsworthy. Notice that a Res_{BIF} is also possible when it is clear that the prejacent is accepted by all in the context, giving rise to a slightly different objection effect, (20B_1):

(20) A: **Como todos esperábamos**, Morgan está de sabático el semestre que viene otra vez.
'As we all expected, Morgan is on sabbatical again next semester.'
B_1: ¡Naturalmente! Si está de sabático cada dos por tres↓.
of course if is.3sg.IND of sabbatical each two by three
'Of course! Morgan is on sabbatical more often than not!'
(i) #Está muy bien.
It's great!
(ii) Es una vergüenza que la universidad le permita esto.
'It's shameful that the university allows this.'
B_2:Sí, (obviamente,) (todos sabemos que) está de sabático cada
yes obviously all know.1pl.IND that is of sabbatical each
dos por tres. Está muy bien / Es una vergüenza.
two by three is very well is a shame
'Yes, (obviously,) (it's known that) Morgan is on sabbatical more often than not. It's great! / It's shameful.'

With the utterance of a Res_{BIF} in (20), B_1 highlights an anomalous state of affairs: Morgan is going on sabbatical next semester despite having been on sabbatical quite recently. Though anomalous, this is not surprising to anyone in the conversation. Still, the effect of uttering the Res_{BIF} is to highlight the correlation of facts, instead of simply allowing the conversation to proceed without comment. B_1's decision to do this can be understood as a way of putting on public record that they object to what is going on (contrast 20B_1i-ii). If a plain declarative had been uttered instead, B_2, there would be no bias towards an objection interpretation, (20B_2). Thus, BIF↓s are not equivalent to declaratives in which the content is taken to be common ground or obvious to the speaker.

Similar facts can be shown when the *if*-clause follows an interrogative.

(21) A: ¿Vienes a la fiesta esta noche?
'Are you coming to the party tonight?'
B_1:'Si tengo un examen mañana↓' [Res_{BIF}]
if have.1.sg.IND a exam tomorrow
'≈Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'

(i) ✓How can you ask me whether I'm going to a party?
(ii) #That's a good question. I'll think about it.

B_2: #Si voy a la fiesta↓
if go.1sg.IND to the party
Intended but unavailable: ≈'Obviously I'm going to the party.'

B_3: Voy a la fiesta. [Decl. (Assert)]
go.1sg.IND to the party
'I'm going to the party.'

B_4: Los dos sabemos que voy a la fiesta. [Decl. (Assert)]
the two know.1pl.IND that go.1sg.IND to the party.
'We all know that I'm going to the party.'

B_5: Obviamente voy a la fiesta. [Decl. (Assert)]
obviously go.1sg.IND to the party
'Obviously I will go to the party.'

In a stereotypical context, ($21B_1$)'s overall interpretation is as an objection to the addressee needing to ask the question, as exemplified with the continuation (B_1i). BIF↓s cannot be used to plainly address (and thus accept) the preceding utterance, (B_1ii). ($21B_2$) further shows that BIF↓s like these are not good direct answers (property (iv)).[11] If they were good direct answers, that would signal (tacit) acceptance of the question, but they are not. Notice that if they were declaratives, we would expect them to be possible direct answers, like their (plain) declarative counterparts (regardless of whether the content is said to be obvious or already accepted), B_3-B_5.

Similar facts are observed (again) when the preceding utterance is an imperative:

(22) Mom: Saca la basura.
'Take out the trash.'

Kid_1: Si es el turno de mi hermana↓.
if is.3sg.IND the turn of my sister
≈'Despite it being my sister's turn?!'
(i) Why should I take out the trash?
(ii) #No problem.

Kid_2: Saco la basura ahora mismo.
take out.1sg.IND the trash now same
'I'll take out the trash right now.'

Kid_3: Obviamente saco la basura ahora mismo(, dado
obviously take out.1sg.IND the trash now given
que lo ordenas).
that cl.ACC order.2sg.IND
'Of course, obviously, since you order it, I'll take out the trash right now.'

[11] ($21B_2$) could be interpreted (marginally) as an objection to A appearing not to know whether B is going to the party, and thus indirectly answering the question. *Si sabes que voy a la fiesta*↓ (lit.: if you know that I go to the party) would be preferred for this purpose.

Kid$_4$: #Si saco la basura ahora mismo↓.
if take out.1sg.IND the trash now same
Intended but unavailable: ≈'Obviously I'll take out the trash right now.'

While the BIF↓ in (22K$_1$) can be used to protest that the mom expresses the preference that the kid take out the trash,[12] as shown by its compatibility with (22K$_1$i), it is infelicitous interpreted as agreeing/accepting to do so, (22K$_1$ii,K$_4$).[13] In contrast, declaratives are fine for this purpose, (22K$_2$), even when indicating that the proffered proposition is obvious, (22K$_3$).

Turning now to sentential negation, (v), as Schwenter (2016b) shows, the prejacent can be claimed to be false (illustrated here with our running example), (23), just as with declaratives. However, unlike with plain declaratives, sentential negation cannot scope over Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, (24):[14]

(23) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓.
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'
Kid:¡No es verdad!
neg is true
'That's not true!'

(24) Kid': *No si tengo un examen mañana↓.
neg if have.1sg an exam tomorrow
Intended: 'It is not the case that, as we all know, I have an exam tomorrow.'

An analysis of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s needs to reconcile that Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s do not behave like declaratives and yet the prejacent may be targeted and claimed to be false.

Let us take stock and summarize the properties of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s and how they differ from the interpretation of plain declaratives (whether or not they convey obviousness and/or that the prejacent is already accepted by all participants in the conversation).

[12] Following Condoravdi and Lauer (2012); Starr (2020), I assume that sentences with imperative marking express the speaker's preferences. Contextual assumptions lead to these being interpreted as commands, advices, invitations, etc.

[13] (22K$_4$) is felicitous if the parent has already expressed the command before and is now insisting. The kid would be protesting that the parent is in such a rush, they are not plainly accepting the command.

[14] (24) is possible with a pause after negation, but in that case we understand that the utterance is an elliptical version of *No sales a jugar si tienes un examen mañana* ('you don't go out to play if you have an exam tomorrow'). I get back to this on pg. 15 and pg. 36 below.

(25) BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s Vs Declaratives

	BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s	Declarative
Prejacent/content true	✓	✓
Prejacent/content presupposed	✓	X
Always Objections	✓	X
Direct Answers	X	✓
Sentential negation	X	✓

As (25) makes apparent, BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s are not equivalent to declaratives regardless of whether they express that the content is 'obvious'. The prejacent needs to be entailed by *cs*. Thus, analyzing Res_{BIF}s as declaratives in which *si* is a discourse marker conveying that the prejacent is obvious is not tenable.[15]

For clarity, note that given the prejacent presupposition of BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s, they are not equivalent to a fully spelled out *if*-construction (and thus they are not merely elliptical). Compare (3) with (26).

(26) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Parent$_1$: #Si tienes un examen mañana, te vas a jugar.
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow cl.2sg go.2sg to play
'If you have an exam tomorrow, you are going out to play.'
Parent$_2$: Si tienes un examen mañana, no te vas
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow neg cl.2sg go.2sg.IND
a jugar.
to play
'If you have an exam tomorrow, you are not going out to play.'

---

[15] The reader may wonder whether *si* is equivalent to *pero* ('but'). This would, by itself, derive the overall objection flavor in Res_{BIF}s and, maybe, other aspects could be derived somehow pragmatically. However, notice that 'but' can appear with BIF↓s, (i), which is expected given that BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s convey objection, but if *si* were *pero*, their co-occurrence would be unexpected.

(i) Mom: Pero si tienes un examen mañana↓.
but if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'But, having an exam tomorrow?!'

Additionally, without *si* and with *pero*, the utterance does not have the same interpretation, contrast ((ii)Mom$_1$) and ((ii)Mom$_2$).

(ii) Mom$_1$: Pero cuidas de tu abuelita esta noche.
but take care.2sg of your granny this night
Intended: 'But you will take care of your grandmother later tonight.'
Mom$_2$: Pero si cuidas de tu abuelita esta noche↓.
but if take care.2sg of your granny this night
a. ≈'Despite having to take care of your grandma tonight?!'
b. ≈'Only if you take care of your grandma tonight.'

While ((ii)Mom$_1$) would be understood as the mother bargaining with the kid and their proposal to go out by offering a new trade off (e.g., *I'll let you go out and you'll take care of your grandma*), ((ii)Mom$_2$), but not ((ii)Mom$_1$), can be interpreted as a Res_{BIF} (ii), i.e., conveying that it is assumed that all participants already accept that the addressee is taking care of their grandma that night. Notice, however, that *pero* is required with BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s in some Spanish varieties, as in Mexican Spanish. This may respond to a historical process and a need to mark explicitly these BIF↓s as objections.

Recovering the apodosis from the content of the previous utterance results in an infelicitous response, (26P$_1$). If we negate the content of the preceding utterance to make it more in the spirit of the BIF↓, (26P$_2$), the parent is taken to be spelling out the circumstances in which the addressee is not going out to play, but is not taking it for granted that the addressee has an exam the following day. The parent in (26P$_2$) can follow up with a question, *do you have an exam tomorrow?*, which is not acceptable with the parallel BIF↓. Thus we see that such BIF↓s are not equivalent to full *if*-constructions.

Now that we have in place an in-depth characterization of BIF↓s as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s we can proceed and compare them with BIF↓s as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, (2).

3 The contrast between Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s and Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s

In this section I first compare the properties of BIF↓s interpreted as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s with those of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s scrutinized above, §3.1. I then discuss the criteria that lead discourse participants to interpret BIF↓s as either Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s or Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, §3.2.

3.1 Descriptive differences between Res$_{\text{bif}}$s and Non-Res$_{\text{bif}}$s

Recall that in addition to Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s like (27Mom$_2$), BIF↓s can also be interpreted as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, in which the recovered apodosis seems to be in a (conditional) dependence relation with the prejacent, (27Mom$_1$).

(27) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom$_1$: Si has terminado los deberes↓. [Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
'≈Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out.'
Mom$_2$: Si tienes un examen mañana↓. [Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'

(27Mom$_1$) does not give rise to the same resistance intuition we saw in the case of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s. This is made prominent by the fact that the mother can add *¡ni hablar!* ('no way!') to the Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ in (27Mom$_2$), but this is not a possible follow up to (27Mom$_1$). In its most prominent reading, the BIF↓ in (27Mom$_1$) "reminds" the kid that only if they have finished their homework will they go out to play. What the mother is actually doing is raising awareness of the constraints on the kid's proposal given the current context (she is "double checking" that they are all on the same page). The effect is somewhat similar to 'you are telling me that you are going out to play only if you have finished your homework'.

Let us now explore how the Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ interpretation of BIF↓s compares with the Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ interpretation regarding (i) sentential negation, (ii) exhaustivity, (iii) shared information and (iv) answers to questions.

3.1.1 Negation

As in the case of Res_{BIF}s (see (24)), BIF↓s interpreted as Non-Res_{BIF}s do not accept sentential negation.

(28) (*No) si has terminado los deberes↓.
neg if have.3sg finished the homework

Negation is not possible without a pause between negation and the BIF↓. Moreover, even if there is a pause after negation, the interpretation wouldn't be sentential negation scoping over the BIF↓. The utterance wouldn't convey that it is not the case that only if the addressee has finished their homework, are they allowed to go out to play. With a pause, (28) would convey that the kid is not going out to play if they have finished their homework(!) (equivalent to the elliptical *you won't (go out to play), if you have finished your homework*).

3.1.2 Exhaustivity

We saw that BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s presuppose the prejacent. In contrast, as I will show below, in the case of the Non-Res_{BIF} in (27Mom_1), the mother indicates, on the one hand, that whether the kid has finished the homework or not is not resolved in *cs* (not presupposed) and, on the other hand, that in the current context, the only proposal the kid could possibly be making is that they go out to play only if they have finished their homework. This is a conditional dependence that is acceptable in stereotypical contexts like ours.

Let us start by the truth of the prejacent. That the prejacent in (27Mom_1) is not resolved in *cs* can be supported by examining possible follow ups: the mother can felicitously follow up (27Mom_1) with (29i), but (29ii) would be infelicitous.

(29) Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↓
if have.2sg finished the homework
'Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play.'
(i) ... y todavía no me has dicho si los has terminado.
'and you have not yet told me whether you have finished it'
(ii) #... y ya me has dicho que los has terminado.
'and you have already told me that you have finished it'

Turning to exhaustivity, it can be demonstrated by the fact that it is infelicitous for the kid to follow up the BIF↓ in (27Mom_1i) by asking *and if I have not finished my homework?* In fact, if the kid dared to ask such a question, the mother could express its infelicity by saying *I told you: you will go out to play only if you have finished your homework.* Additionally, in a context in which it is understood that the kid can go out to play provided that they either have finished their homework or have scheduled a tutoring lesson for later in the afternoon, the kid could protest the mother's response in (27Mom_1i) by saying *but I have scheduled a tutoring lesson for later!* This protest would only

make sense if the mother's utterance conveys that going out to play necessarily correlates with being done with one's homework.

Intuitions about exhaustivity are different in the case of '↑', (30Mom), where the kid's follow up question is licensed and the mother cannot claim to have provided that information already.

(30) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↑.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈'If you have finished your homework, you will go out.'
Kid: ¿Y si no he terminado los deberes?
'And if I have not finished my homework?'
Mom: Ya veremos.
'We'll see.'

Since contextual strengthening is highly plausible in power-imbalance situations as in (30), here is another example illustrating that exhaustivity may be absent with '↑':

(31) A: ¿Vienes a la fiesta?
'Are you coming to the party?'
B: Si es después de las nueve↑
if is after of the nine
'If it is after nine...'
A: And if it is before nine?
B: I'll have to see what I can arrange at work.

With '↓' instead of '↑', A's follow up is infelicitous (the information is already provided).[16]

We have seen that BIF↓s convey that the prejacent presents the only conditions for the truth of the apodosis (exhaustivity) but BIF↑s don't. The connection between '↓' and exhaustivity has already been explored in the literature. Zimmermann (2000) already noted that numerations, (32), ended with '↓' signal that only the listed elements have a particular property, whereas '↑' indicates that something may follow and, hence, that the list is incomplete.

(32) A: Which tube stations are one stop from Oxford Circus?
B: Piccadilly Circus, Bond Street, Tottenham Court Road, Green Park, Warren Street, Regent's Park ↑ / ↓

[16] Of course, if A utters their follow up after a BIF↓, we could understand that A is being playful and, for whatever reason (maybe fishing for information), is grabbing on to the fact that B used an *if*-clause and is ignoring everything else. Even if B goes along with their misbehavior and addresses the question instead of being confrontational, in its pretense of obliviousness, A's follow up is somewhat similar to asking *and if I'm not hungry?* after one is told *if you are hungry, there are biscuits on the table.*

The same has been argued to apply to non-*wh*-interrogatives (see, e.g., Pruitt 2008; Biezma 2009; Biezma and Rawlins 2012; see also Westera 2017): alternative questions use '↓', to indicate that the spelled out alternatives are the only ones live. '↑' doesn't indicate that and we obtain a polar question interpretation instead. Importantly these patterns also hold in Spanish (see, e.g., Estebas-Vilaplana and Prieto 2010). In general, when the speaker presents possible alternatives, they can choose between '↑'/'↓' and the choice is meaningful. Interestingly, Schwarz (2014) suggests that *if*-constructions with a final *if*-clause (e.g., ψ, *if* ϕ) might be more likely to be interpreted as strengthened, i.e., as 'only if ϕ, ψ', where the *if*-clause would present exhaustive conditions for the truth of the protasis. While prosody was not controlled in Schwarz (2014), one could speculate that *if*-clauses in final position can more easily have a final fall (being at the end of the sentence). Importantly, in this case too the speaker could have placed the *if*-clause in sentence initial position, in which case it would have had a rising continuation-contour ('↑'). There may be different ways to capture the effect of the contrast in prosody when spelling out different alternatives (be it in declaratives, in interrogatives or in spelling sufficient conditions). For simplicity, in this paper I follow previous literature and encode exhaustivity in '↓'.[17] In §4 I show that we can derive differences between Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s while maintaining the same interpretation for '↓'.

3.1.3 Presuppositions

Just as in the case of BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s, the BIF↓ in (27Mom_1) is taken to spell out assumptions that already hold in the context in which the kid's assertion is evaluated. In the case of Res_{BIF}s, we examined follow-ups to show that the prejacent is presupposed (see (15-16)). We can use the same strategy to show that, in contrast, in Non-Res_{BIF}s only exhaustivity is presupposed: it is presupposed that only prejacent-worlds are apodosis-worlds. Consider the Non-Res_{BIF} in (27Mom_1): if the kid didn't know about the iff-condition (or if it cannot be easily accommodated), the mother's utterance is infelicitous, as pointed out by the kid's response (see also ftn. 18):

(33) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'

[17] A reviewer points out that '↓' doesn't convey exhaustivity across clause-types (it may plainly be a default sentence-final contour). Thus, encoding exhaustivity into '↓' when combined with BIFs is a conventionalization after all. I would add that it is not just in BIFs, but wherever it is conventionally conveyed that there is more than one alternative, as noted above. The reviewer suggests an alternative in which '↓' is meaningless and what matters is our reasoning about why the speaker didn't use a meaningful '↑'. The reviewer points to, e.g., Goodhue (to appear), who makes similar claims based on English. While this is an interesting new idea, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address whether it is indeed right for English or what the actual meaning of the rise may be (see Biezma 2020 for arguments supporting that similar rises may have different interpretations across clause types), nor whether it is feasible for Spanish. The main point for me in this paper is that there is a meaningful contribution by intonation and that, everything being equal, BIF↓s convey exhaustivity while BIF↑s don't. While this could be modeled in different ways, here I'm choosing a conservative approach.

Mom$_1$: Si has terminado los deberes↓.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈'Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out.'
Kid: ¿Desde cuándo sólo puedo salir a jugar si he terminado los deberes?
'Since when is it the case that I can only go out to play if I have finished my homework?'

In contrast, the (full) *if*-construction, (34Mom), can be uttered to establish a new constraint: the mother could be imposing a new condition on going out to play.[18] In this case, the kid can protest against a new rule being established, but the kid could not protest against the mother reminding them of a rule they didn't know about:

(34) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si has terminado los deberes, te vas a
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework cl.2sg go.2sg.IND to
jugar.
play.INF
'If you are done with your homework, you will go out to play.'
Kid: Why this new rule? / # Since when?

After the Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$, if the kid wants to go out without problems, they only have one option: confirm that in fact they have finished their homework (asserting the prejacent), (35).

(35) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↓. [Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈'Only if you have finished the homework, you will go out to play.'
Kid: I have finished the homework.

Of course, given the exhaustivity presupposition, if the mother is seeing the kid going out, an utterance of (35M) simply checks that the mother is correct in assuming that the kid has finished their homework. ([play iff homework &

[18] That in a Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ the rule is already set before the utterance of the *if*-clause can also be seen in a scenario in which the kid is not obviously trying to sneak out. The bare-*if*-clause is possible if the constraints are known or can be accommodated, but not otherwise. Assuming that little sisters do not impose rules on big siblings (hence accommodation is not likely), Kid$_2$ is odd:

(i) Kid: Hermanita, a las 5 me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Little sister, I'm going out to play at 5.'
Sister: Si has terminado los deberes↓. [Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈ 'You mean that you will only go out to play if you have finished your homework.'
Kid$_1$: Sí, claro. No hace falta que me lo recuerdes. A esa hora ya habré terminado.
'Yes, of course. You don't need to remind me. I'll be done by then.'
Kid$_2$:#Sí claro. Como digas.
'Yes, of course. Whatever you say.'

play]=[play & homework]). If the kid's assertion is about the distant future instead, simply agreeing with the parent can be enough:

(36) Kid: Mañana voy a jugar a casa de Morgan.
'I'll go to Morgan's house to play tomorrow.'
Mother: Si has terminado los deberes↓.
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
≈'Only if you've finished your homework, you'll go to Morgan's house to play.'
Kid: Claro. Si no he terminado los deberes no voy a jugar. No hace falta que me lo recuerdes.
'Of course. If I have not finished my homework, I won't go to Morgan's. You do not need to remind me of that.'
Mother: Vale.
'Ok then.'

The kid in (36) is merely agreeing with the parent that what they really mean is that they will go to Morgan's having finished their homework. In fact, it is then that the parent can proceed to evaluate the kid's proposal and, as in (36), finally accept it.

In contrast to Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, (35), asserting the prejacent is not felicitous with Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, (37K$_1$):

(37) Kid: Mom, I'm going out to play.
Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓. [Res$_{\text{BIF}}$]
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Having an exam tomorrow?!
Kid$_1$: #I have an exam tomorrow.
Kid$_2$: ✓I finished studying already.

Asserting the prejacent, (37K$_1$), merely voices what was already taken as presupposed by the BIF↓: that the kid has an exam the following day. This merely "repeats" what was said without explaining how come they intend to go out to play in such circumstances. A felicitous response involves addressing the apparent violation of normalcy, (37K$_2$) (e.g., *I have already finished studying; it's just an easy test*).

3.1.4 Answers to questions

The last point of comparison refers to whether BIF↓s as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s are good direct answers to questions. We saw that Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s are not (see (21)) and a unified analysis would have to explain the source of their differences/similarities. The data is slightly complex because, contrary to the case of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s, the prejacent and recovered apodosis in a Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ stand in an acceptable dependence relation. Spelling out the apodosis explicitly would result in an acceptable *if*-construction. This raises the possibility that when we find an

if-clause that seems bare, this may indeed be a BIF↓ as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ or a regular *if*-construction with a consequent that is not phonologically spelled out. However, as we will see below, it is still possible to tell the two cases apart.

Descriptively, the observation is that *if*-clauses with '↓' are good complete answers to *when*-type-questions and at least partial answers to polar questions:

(38) A: Under what circumstances would you come to the party?/Are you coming to the party?
Parent: Si no viene Chris↓.
if neg come.3sg Chris
'I'll go only if Chris doesn't.'

There is a contrast between (38) and what we have seen for Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s. As we have already noted, Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s offer a more detailed version of what was proposed. They raise awareness of the the fact that what the speaker has been asked to accept (e.g., that the kid is going out in our running example) actually depends on the fact expressed in the prejacent (e.g., that they have finished their homework). Importantly, this dependence is backgrounded: the Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ can only serve as a reminder. None of these features are present in examples like (38), which I take to be a regular *if*-clause. Regular *if*-clauses can be used to spell out the circumstances for something, q, being the case (e.g. that the addressee goes to the party). Thus, they may be used as direct (partial) answers to questions in which what is relevant is whether q is true, or when is q true. When the prejacent of the *if*-clause, p (e.g., that Chris doesn't come) and the content of the question, q, can be construed as (conditionally) dependent, it is easy to see the *if*-clause as relevant and providing circumstances making q true without the need to spell q out (i.e., as a fragment answer; see, e.g., Merchant 2004 or Jacobson 2016). My conclusion is that *if*-clauses with '↓' that provide answers to interrogatives as in (38) are not BIF↓s under ANY interpretation. In §4 I provide a semantics for BIF↓s that makes sense of their contrast with regular *if*-clauses.

Though BIF↓s do not provide answers to questions, they seem to be able to show up as a kind of 'response'. Like in the case of declaratives, they raise awareness of properties of the context. In the case of questions, regarding the conditions on which the acceptance to the question depends:

(39) A, B and C are catching up at a cafe. Looking for juicy gossip, A asks C about common acquaintances:
A: ¿Se casaron Sam y Morgan?'
'Did Sam and Morgan get married?'
B: [Looking at C significantly] Si se puede contar↓.
if cl.3sg can.3sg tell
≈'Only answer the question if it is ok/you are allowed to do so.'

In what follows I spell out the details with respect to BIF↓s as responses to proposals to update *cs*, i.e., as responses to declaratives. However, the proposal extends also to responses to interrogatives or imperatives.

3.2 When is a BIF↓ interpreted as a Res_{BIF} or a Non-Res_{BIF}?

We have reviewed the similarities between BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s and as Non-Res_{BIF}s but what is the factor predicting whether we interpret a BIF↓ as a Res_{BIF} or a Non-Res_{BIF}? The interpretation of a BIF↓ as a Res_{BIF} or a Non-Res_{BIF} is determined by the relation with what precedes it. Making stereotypical assumptions about how the world works, the *if*-clauses in (27) differ only in how they relate to the preceding utterance.

(27) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom_1: Si has terminado los deberes↓. [Non-Res_{BIF}]
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
'≈Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out.'
Mom_2: Si tienes un examen mañana↓. [Res_{BIF}]
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'

Our (stereotypical) assumptions of normalcy are not defied by the kid going out to play having finished their homework, (27Mom_1), but they are defied by the kid having an exam the next day and going out to play (having an exam the following day defeasibly entails staying home studying), (27Mom_2). Res_{BIF}s arise when the correlation between the prejacent and the ('recovered') apodosis is anomalous (the prejacent defeasibly entails the falsity of the apodosis). By uttering the BIF↓ the mother makes the anomaly prominent (the kid would be going out while having an exam!), hence making it apparent that the proposal to update the context is not likely to be accepted and the kid will have some explaining to do before going out. To see that our interpretation relies on assumptions of normalcy in the given context, notice that the BIF↓ in (27Mom_1) can be interpreted as a Res_{BIF} in a different context:

(40) It is mutually accepted by all that the kid has finished their homework. There is a background assumption that when the kid has finished their homework, they have carte blanche to do whatever they want **without asking for permission** (otherwise they have to ask) and, in fact, they shouldn't bug their parents (who work at home and don't want to be disturbed).
Kid:Mamá, me voy a jugar.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom:Si has terminado los deberes↓.
if have.2sg.IND finished of study
'You have finished your school work!'
Mom continued: why are you telling me?! / # It's great you are telling me!

In this scenario, the busy annoyed parent can utter the BIF↓ in (40B) as an objection that the Kid is bugging her, and it is not possible to interpret the BIF↓ as not complaining. This example also illustrates that BIF↓s do not need to protest against the content of the preceding utterance. Here it protests against the kid feeling the need to tell the parent something.

3.3 Taking stock

There are three main lessons to learn from this discussion. First, that '↓' alone is not responsible for the interpretation of a BIF as Res_{BIF}: while '↓' is needed for a Res_{BIF}, a BIF↓ can also be a Non-Res_{BIF}. Second, that the interpretation of a BIF↓ as a Res_{BIF} or a Non-Res_{BIF} is tied to the preceding context. We obtain a Non-Res_{BIF} when the correlation between the prejacent and the recovered apodosis does not defy our (defeasible) assumptions of normalcy. We obtain a Res_{BIF} when it does. The third lesson is that '↓' conveys exhaustivity: only 'prejacent-worlds' are 'apodosis-worlds'. We have already observed this in Non-Res_{BIF}s. As we will discuss in the next section, in the case of Res_{BIF}s, exhaustivity is "masked" by the prejacent-presupposition: in Res_{BIF}s, all worlds are prejacent worlds.

Similarities and differences between BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s are summarized in (41), where the Res_{BIF}'s properties are modified from (25) to include the lessons learned in this section and in the order presented.

(41) Res_{BIF}s vs Non-Res_{BIF}s.

	BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s	BIF↓s as Non-Res_{BIF}s
Sentential negation	X	X
Exhaustivity presupposed	✓	✓
Prejacent presupposed	✓	X
Felicitious assertion of the prejacent	X	✓
Always Objections	✓	X
Direct Answers	X	X
Prejacent∧apodosis defy normalcy assumptions	✓	X

In §4 I provide an analysis deriving these similarities and differences while maintaining a parallel approach to the meaning of *if*-clauses in adjoined contexts.

4 BIF↓s as across-speaker *if*-clauses + '↓'

The goal is to provide an analysis in which adjoined *if*-clauses and BIF↓s receive a uniform treatment as restrictors and derive their differences somehow else. In §4.1 I provide an interpretation of *if*-clauses as adjoined clauses and in §4.2 I address the contribution of '↓'. My analysis has two main ingredients. The leading idea guiding the analysis is that BIF↓s provide a commentary on the context update proposal that has just been made, raising awareness about how

it relates to the truth of the prejacent. This requires an analysis relying on a dynamic model representing context updates. Additionally, my analysis derives differences in the interpretation of BIF↓s appealing to mechanisms needed independently. In particular, I propose that the contrast between Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s is derived in a manner that is parallel to pragmatic accounts explaining the differences between Austinian biscuit conditionals (e.g., *if you are hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard*) and hypothetical conditionals (e.g., *if it rains, we'll cancel the picnic*). The key resides in the dependence assumptions that can be encoded in *cs* (see, e.g., Franke 2009; Biezma and Goebel 2023). In §4.3 I show how the analysis explains the data reviewed in §2.1. The core insight is that BIF↓s encode presuppositions about the correlation between the prejacent and the recovered apodosis in the context of interpretation, and raise awareness of what the actual proposal would mean in that regard.

4.1 *If*-clauses and definedness

Let us look first at regular *if*-constructions to introduce the basic theoretical assumptions that will be necessary. There are several approaches to the interpretation of *if*-clauses in the literature. For the sake of simplicity I adopt Heim's Stalnaker-like possible worlds semantics for indicative conditionals (Heim, 1992). This will also allow us to seamlessly adopt Heim's widely familiar dynamic semantics for *if*-constructions. In this system, *if*-clauses are syntactic adjuncts and restrict the domain of operators, possibly silent (see, e.g., Lewis 1975; Kratzer 1981, 1986; Heim 1982; Farkas and Sugioka 1983; Rawlins 2013). The point made in this paper, however, could be cashed out within other approaches.

Let us consider regular indicative *if*-constructions.

(42) Si mañana hace sol, iremos de pícnic.
if tomorrow do.3sg.PRES.IND sun go.1pl.FUT.IND of picnic
'If it's sunny tomorrow, we'll go on a picnic.'

The verbal morphology in the *if*-clause and matrix clause mark this *if*-construction as indicative. As noted in §1, the indicative *if*-clause carries a presupposition that the protasis is compatible with *cs*. The definedness conditions for (indicative) *if*-clauses are in (43).

(43) $[\![\text{If } \phi]\!]$ defined only if $\exists w' \in cs$ s.t. $[\![\phi]\!](w') = 1$

Below is Heim's (1992) proposal for the semantics of *if*-constructions:

(44) a. $w \in [\![\text{if } \phi, \psi]\!]$ iff $Sim_w([\![\phi]\!]) \subseteq [\![\psi]\!]$
b. $Sim_w(p) \underset{\text{def}}{=} \{w' \in W : w' \in p$ and w' resembles w no less than any other world in $p\}$

Indicative *if*-constructions state that the worlds most similar to the evaluation world w in which the protasis is true are worlds in which the apodosis

is also true. The prejacent simply presents sufficient conditions for the truth of the apodosis. For (42) this means that the most similar worlds to the evaluation world w in which it is sunny tomorrow are worlds in which we go on a picnic (where the *if*-construction is defined only if there are worlds in *cs* in which it is sunny tomorrow). According to the classic analysis in (44), *if*-clauses do not have truth conditions but restrict the domain for the matrix clause. Additionally, according to (43), *if*-clauses check presuppositions: the presupposition triggered by indicative mood in the *if*-clause is that there are indeed worlds in *cs* in which the prejacent is true.

4.2 The interpretation of BIF↓

We have seen above that BIF↓s can have either a Res_{BIF} or a Non-Res_{BIF} interpretation and the choice is tied to the context of utterance. What the two interpretations have in common is *exhaustivity*, linked to '↓': the exhaustivity strengthening ensures that in both Non-Res_{BIF}s and Res_{BIF}s it is presupposed that there are no worlds in which the prejacent is false and the apodosis is true. However, in Res_{BIF}s it is further presupposed that there are no worlds in which the prejacent is false, while in Non-Res_{BIF}s this is undecided. The additional presupposition 'masks' exhaustivity in Res_{BIF}s.

In §4.2.1 I start by providing an analysis of BIF↓ that follows from usual assumptions regarding the interpretation of *if*-clauses once we take into consideration '↓'. In §4.2.2 I show how this analysis derives Non-Res_{BIF}s, and in §4.2.3 I show how the same semantics derives the desired interpretation of BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s.

4.2.1 The core interpretation of BIF↓s

I assume that utterances are proposals to update the context that need to be evaluated (accepted/rejected/resisted). Formally, the context of evaluation c contains the information we keep track of in discourse. Minimally, this is information about how things are (*cs*), about what the discourse goals are, i.e., the *question under discussion* (QUD, a stack of sets of propositions; see, e.g. Roberts 1996), and about participants' preferences (PREF, a stack of propositions; see e.g., Condoravdi and Lauer 2012; Starr 2020). Discourse moves, M, are communicative events associated with a particular sentential force and tied to a particular context. Sentential force signals the context component to be (primarily) updated: declaratives are proposals to update *cs*, i.e. assertions (Farkas and Bruce 2010); interrogatives are proposals to update QUD, i.e., questions (Biezma and Rawlins 2017); and imperatives are proposals to update PREF (Starr 2020).

While the primary update is indicated by the sentential force, assumptions about the speaker's epistemic state in making a proposal are also part of the context-update proposal (e.g., that the speaker believes the content of a declarative when uttering one, or that the speaker believes that they do not know the answer when uttering an interrogative). Additionally, commitments made by

the speaker regarding entailments, presuppositions and (non-cancelled) implicatures triggered by the utterance are also part of what is evaluated (see, e.g., Stalnaker 2002; Gunlogson 2008). In general, anything that agents publicly treat as true for the purposes of the discourse in making a discourse move is part of the context-update proposal that needs to be evaluated.[19] I refer to the set of propositions updating *cs* via a move M_i as the propositions TRIGGERED by M_i. Much current research focuses on how to model context updates generated by inferences triggered by utterances and this has been taken to require a more complex view of the CG/*cs* that falls outside the scope of this paper (see, e.g., Camp 2018; Harris 2020). Here I simplify and adopt the familiar Stalnakerian *cs* associated to a given CG.

I characterize BIF↓s as a responses to a context-update proposal awaiting evaluation. The idea to be captured in the semantics of BIF↓s is that (i) they spell out properties of *cs* in the context in which the proposal is awaiting evaluation (properties of *cs* before evaluation), and (ii) they *precisify* the proposal by spelling out details that may have at first appeared overlooked. Any proposition TRIGGERED by the original utterance can serve as the missing apodosis (as long as the result is discursively relevant).[20] For example, the proposition that the speaker believes not to know the answer to a question, TRIGGERED by uttering an interrogative (see (21)), or the proposition that the speaker considers a particular proposition as news-worthy, TRIGGERED by uttering a declarative (see (19)), can also fulfill the role of apodosis. They enter in the computation of the BIF↓'s meaning, resulting in a relevant overall interpretation (see discussion in §3.1). We will go through case studies in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3

Crucially, to spell out the analysis sketched above, we need dynamic models in which proposals to update context are placed in a 'waiting room' to be evaluated. Intuitively, BIF↓s are all about raising awareness of the properties of the context in which the proposal has been made and of the implications of the context-update awaiting evaluation. We can think of the 'waiting room' as a *look ahead* slot (be it, e.g., the 'table' in Farkas and Bruce 2010 or the 'future context' in Biezma and Rawlins 2017). Dynamic models with look-ahead slots provide fully explicit spell-outs of the mechanisms that manage it throughout the conversation. In this paper I present a simplified account, since not all aspects of those models are necessary for the essence of my analysis. In what follows, I will use P-UP$_c$ (*prospective update* of *c*) to refer to the waiting room of a context *c*. The proposal to update *c* via M_i by an agent

[19] This is an adaption of Gunlogson's (2008) *commitment slates*.

[20] That contextual assumptions can fill in the necessary arguments in the construction of meaning is not news. See for example the case of on non-temporal *then* (from Biezma 2014 building on Gunlogson 2008):

(i) A student asks a question after a semantics class:
Student: What does "lambda"' mean?
Prof: Then you didn't understand the lecture.

Non-temporal *then* articulates a relation between two propositions. In (i) these are that the student doesn't know what "lambda" means (the assumption behind the question) and that the student didn't understand the lecture.

a may include updating cs (UP_{a,cs_c,M_i}), updating the QUD ($\text{UP}_{a,\text{QUD}_c,M_i}$) or updating the set of preferences PREF ($\text{UP}_{a,\text{PREF}_c,M_i}$). This means that P-$\text{UP}_c$ needs to be a complex object, P-$\text{UP}_c = \langle \text{UP}_{a,cs_c,M_i}, \text{UP}_{a,\text{QUD}_c,M_i}, \text{UP}_{a,\text{PREF}_c,M_i} \rangle$. For our purposes, we will be mainly interested in UP_{a,cs_c,M_i}. Incorporating a waiting room in our view of the information we keep track of in conversation leads to a characterization of context as a tuple that includes P-UP_c: $c = \langle cs, \text{QUD}, \text{PREF}, \text{P-UP} \rangle$.

When there is a proposal awaiting evaluation, P-$\text{UP}_c \neq \emptyset$, relevant utterances must address it. The default for a proposal awaiting evaluation is (silent) acceptance, and the waiting room is then emptied (see, e.g., Farkas and Bruce 2010; Biezma and Rawlins 2017 for ways to spell out these mechanisms). Of course, acceptance can also be made public, but what absolutely needs to be made public is rejection or resistance. For our purposes, the definition of UP_{a,cs_c,M_i} in (45) suffices:[21]

(45) Let c be a context, $c = \langle cs, \text{QUD}, \text{PREF}, \text{P-UP} \rangle$, M_i be a discourse move to be evaluated in c, P-$\text{UP}_c = \langle \text{UP}_{a,cs_c,M_i}, \text{UP}_{a,\text{QUD}_c,M_i}, \text{UP}_{a,\text{PREF}_c,M_i} \rangle$ the update proposed via M_i by an agent a.
$\text{UP}_{a,cs_c,M_i} = \{w : w \in \bigcap \{p : p \text{ TRIGGERED by } M_i\} \cap cs_c\}$

PARAPHRASE: The cs_c-update proposal by a via M_i is the set of worlds in the intersection of the propositions TRIGGERED by M_i that are part of cs.

With this in hand we can now define the semantics of BIF↓s in (46). Their interpretation is parallel to that of syntactically adjoined *if*-clauses. However, while the latter are interpreted compositionally via (44), BIF↓s presuppose that there is a propositional object salient in c which can be recovered as the apodosis. In the simplified presentation in (46), I cash out this conventionalization with an index in the structure interpreted via the variable assignment g.[22] Like regular *if*-clauses, BIF↓s do not have truth conditions, but definedness conditions. Given (46), BIF↓s are always responses: they are anaphoric and relate the prejacent to the proposed context-update awaiting evaluation, P-UP_c.[23]

The analysis reflects the view that BIF↓s do not make a claim, and do not provide 'at issue' content. BIF↓s merely 'check' that all conversation participants are on the same page regarding the backgrounded information while coordinating the participant's understanding of what the future context will be like. They make precise what the update awaiting evaluation actually looks like, uncovering details that may have seemed overlooked.

[21] QUD and PREF are commonly considered as stacks of sets of propositions (i.e., questions) and of propositions respectively, and their update is governed by different operations on stacks (not '∩'). I do not introduce them here but the reader is referred to, e.g., Kaufmann 2000; Isaacs and Rawlins 2008 for such operations. The system sketched here is a simplification of that in Biezma and Rawlins 2017; Biezma 2020; Biezma and Goebel 2023.

[22] In a fully spelled-out discourse model one could have a fully unified approach to *if*-clauses in which the apodosis can either be provided syntactically, or by selecting a salient proposition in the current context update (i.e., in the update proposal).

[23] A reviewer rightly points out that the denotation of '↓' is adapted to BIFs and not applicable to all clause-types in which exhaustivity is conveyed. Supporting and providing such a general denotation for '↓' is beyond the scope of this paper.

(46) Let c be the context of utterance and g an assignment function.
$[\![[\text{Si } \phi]_j \downarrow]\!]^{c,g}$ defined only if
(i) (follow-up) $\exists M_i$, where M_i is a discourse move in c awaiting evaluation, with an associated update proposal ($\text{P-UP}_c \neq \emptyset$)
(ii) (indicative presup.) $\exists w' \in cs_c$ s.t. $[\![\phi]\!]^{c,g}(w') = 1$ &
(iii) (anaphora) $\exists q_{\langle s,t\rangle} \in \{p : p \text{ is TRIGGERED by } M_i\} \& q = g(j)$ &
(iv) ('↓') $\forall w'' \in cs_c,\ q(w'') = 1 \rightarrow [\![\phi]\!]^{c,g}(w'') = 1$ &
(v) (P-UP_c precisification) $\text{UP}_{a,cs_c,M_i} \subseteq \{w : Sim_w([\![\phi]\!]^{c,g}) \subseteq q\}$
PARAPHRASE: The interpretation of a BIF↓ in a context c is defined only if (i) it follows a discourse move M_i still awaiting evaluation; (ii) there are worlds in the original cs (cs_c) in which the prejacent is true; (iii) there is a salient proposition (apodosis) triggered by M_i; (iv) only in the worlds in cs_c in which the prejacent is true, is the apodosis true and (v) the updated cs_c awaiting evaluation in P-UP_c is that it is not the case that the prejacent is true and the apodosis isn't (*precisification* arising from *if*-construction).

Notice that, having only definedness conditions, BIF↓s simply check whether all participants are on the same page regarding the context (in a sense they perform a "test"; see Veltman 1996). They are devices to raise awareness of the properties of the context and the implications of the context update awaiting evaluation. If their definedness conditions are not met, it will be clear to participants that there is a misalignment in their assumptions about c.

4.2.2 BIF↓s as Non-Res_{BIF}s

Let us see how the analysis above explains our intuitions about BIF↓s as Non-Res_{BIF}s by exploring our running example, repeated in (47).

(47) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si has terminado los deberes↓. [Non-Res_{BIF}]
if have.2sg.IND finished the homework
'≈Only if you have finished your homework, you'll go out to play.'

We saw above that the BIF↓ in (47) is used to point out that the kid's claim can only be interpreted as asserting that they are going out to play only in case they have finished their homework (while whether the kid has actually finished their homework has not been resolved). We also saw that BIF↓s are not equivalent to spelled-out *if*-constructions and neither do they accept sentential negation. Let us see how our analysis derives these facts.

As an *if*-clause, the BIF↓ restricts the domain of an update. According to (46) we need to retrieve a salient propositional object from the context rendering the utterance relevant. The proposition the kid has put forward to update cs (that they are going out to play) is readily available and renders the mother's utterance relevant: while it is not a plain acceptance, by clarifying what the

kid's proposal actually is, it addresses it. I paraphrase the interpretation below and proceed to work out the details.

(48) $[\![$If you have finished your homework↓$]\!]^{c,g}$ defined only if (i) there is a previous move M awaiting evaluation (the kid's utterance); (ii) there are worlds in cs_c in which the kid has finished their homework (indicative presupposition); (iii) a proposition q has been made salient by M; (iv) it is presupposed that within cs_c only in the worlds in which the kid has finished their homework is q true ('↓'); and (v) all the worlds in cs awaiting evaluation in which the kid has finished their homework are worlds in which q is true (precisification). The proposition that the kid goes out to play is readily available and provides a relevant overall contribution: the parent conveys that the update that has been proposed is that only in the worlds in which the kid has finished their homework, do they go out to play.

Let me introduce a pictorial representation of the update to help illustrate the differences between regular *if*-constructions and BIF↓s as Non-Res_{BIF}s. This will help us to later better understand the contrast with Res_{BIF}s. I start with regular *if*-constructions. Based on (44), Heim (1992) provides the following context update rules:

(49) Let cs be a context set and ϕ and ψ syntactic objects:
  a. $cs + \phi = \{w \in cs : w \in [\![\phi]\!]\}$
  b. $cs + if\,\phi, \psi = \{w \in cs : Sim_w(cs + \phi + \psi) = Sim_w(cs + \phi)\}$

Updating a cs like (50-i) via (49b) amounts to obtaining a cs in which there are no worlds in which the protasis is true and the apodosis isn't, (50-ii). This means that in the resulting cs, if we learn that $[\![\phi]\!]$ is true, we would not learn any new information if we were later told that $[\![\psi]\!]$ is true. The resulting cs thus encodes a conditional dependence between two facts: learning $[\![\phi]\!]$ leads us to learning $[\![\psi]\!]$ (see Biezma and Goebel 2023 for discussion of dependencies).

(50) Updating cs with *if* ϕ, ψ



(i) Initial cs (all combinations available)

(ii) cs updated with *if* ϕ, ψ

Let us turn to BIF↓s, (51). They raise awareness about the fact that cs_c is such that there are no worlds in which the prejacent, $[\![\phi]\!]$, is false and and the recovered apodosis q is true (exhaustivity), (51-i) (e.g., there are no worlds in

which the kid has not finished their homework and they go out to play). They also raise awareness of the implications of the proposal with respect to $[\![\phi]\!]$, i.e., they presuppose that in the *cs* corresponding to the proposal awaiting evaluation (UP_{a,cs_c,M_i}), there are no worlds in which $[\![\phi]\!]$ is true and q is not (precisification) (e.g., for the BIF↓in (47), that there are no worlds in which the kid finishes the homework and doesn't go out to play), (51-ii). Ultimately, the only proposal the kid can be making is that they go out having finished their homework or, else, they don't go out, (51-iii).

(51) Where q is the proposition that the kid is going out to play and $[\![\phi]\!]$ that the kid has finished their homework.



(i) Exhaustivity presupposes cs_c has no gray area



(ii) BIF↓'s precisification presupposes *cs* in the update proposal has no gray area



(iii) *cs* in update proposal awaiting evaluation spelled out by BIF↓ ($\text{Non-Res}_{\text{BIF}}$)

Let's now see the BIF↓ in (47) at work, (52). The kid's utterance *seems* to simply propose to update the context with the proposition that they are going out to play, q, (52-i). The mother's BIF↓ raises awareness of the relation between q and the kid having finished their homework, $[\![\phi]\!]$ (there are no worlds in which $[\![\phi]\!]$ is false and q true). Given the kid's utterance, the BIF↓ spells out that the only update the kid can be proposing (and that the mother can be asked to evaluate) is that the kid indeed goes out, having finished their homework, and that they won't go out if they have not, (51-iii)/(52-ii). The *cs* resulting from this spelled-out proposal encodes acceptable (conditional) dependencies between going out or not and having finished the homework or not (i.e., *cs* doesn't go counter our presuppositions of possible dependencies; see below).

(52) **$\text{Non-Res}_{\text{BIF}}$ Interpretation**: Where $[\![\phi]\!]$ is the prejacent of a BIF↓ and q the recovered apodosis s.t. a correlation between $[\![\phi]\!]$ and q does not defy our (defeasible) assumptions of normalcy ($\text{Non-Res}_{\text{BIF}}$).



(i) What the kid seems to be proposing (update to eliminate gray area)



(ii) BIF↓: Mother's spell-out of kid's proposal with respect to $[\![\phi]\!]$ in cs_c (update to eliminate gray area)

In the analysis proposed, the mother is not making a proposal herself, but is only spelling out details of the proposal awaiting evaluation. The mother's

precisification has the flavor of reminding the kid of what she takes the proposal to be given the properties of the the original *cs*. This only makes sense if whether the kid has finished their homework or not is not yet resolved (see pg. 15): if the kid wants to go out, the kid needs to first state whether they are done with the homework (see discussion in pg. 17). Given that the mother is only clarifying the properties of the context against which to evaluate the kid's proposal, that there are no worlds in which the kid has not finished their homework and goes out to play cannot be news ('↓'; see discussion on pg. 17).

All the content of BIF↓s is presuppositional. Notice the contrast with (53), in which the mother makes a parallel metalinguistic claim instead of uttering a (presuppositional) BIF↓:

(53) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Me estás diciendo que sólo te vas a jugar a la calle si has terminado los deberes.
'You are telling me that you are only going out to play if you are done with your homework.'
Kid: No, (no estoy diciendo eso,) te estoy diciendo que me voy a la calle, sin más.
'No, (that's not what I'm saying,) i am just saying that I'm going out to play.'

In (53) the mother makes a claim about what the kid's actual proposal is, and the kid can reject such claim by saying that it is not what was said. The rejection response in (53) would not be possible if the mother had uttered the parallel BIF↓ instead. Contrary to the mother's utterance in (53), BIF↓s do not 'make claims'. By uttering a BIF↓, the speaker is making manifest (thus recording in the public record) that they are fully aware of the significance of accepting the previous move. This is the only context-update triggered by the BIF↓, but it is not at the level of the utterance's content and not encoded in its semantics (we return to the negation of the prejacent cases seen in §2 in §4.3).

We have now seen an illustration of how (46) explains the interpretation of BIF↓s as Non-Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s. These are cases in which the correlation of prejacent and recovered apodosis does not defy assumptions of normalcy and their (conditional) dependence does not go counter our presuppositions. We turn to the case of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s below.

4.2.3 BIF↓s as Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s

It is not yet clear how to obtain a Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ from (46): the overall meaning of the Res$_{\text{BIF}}$ is not only that the relevant apodosis-worlds in the *cs* awaiting evaluation are also prejacent-worlds, it further requires that the prejacent be true in all worlds in cs_c. The analysis additionally has to explain why Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s convey an objection to the preceding utterance. In what follows I argue that the particularities of Res$_{\text{BIF}}$s can be recovered without ad-hoc stipulations following

the same reasoning as has been proposed in pragmatic accounts of *biscuit conditionals* (see Franke 2009; Biezma and Goebel 2023).

Recall our running example from (2):

(54) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓. [Res_{BIF}]
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Despite having an exam tomorrow?!'

The mother's response is not an acceptance of the kid's proposal. Assuming again that the salient proposition required by the BIF↓ is the content of the previous utterance (i.e., that the kid is going out to play), we obtain the conditions paraphrased in (55):

(55) $[\![$Si tienes un examen mañana↓$]\!]^{c,g}$ defined only if (i) there is a previous move M awaiting evaluation (the kid's utterance); (ii) there are worlds in cs_c in which the kid has an exam tomorrow (indicative presupposition); (iii) a proposition q has been made salient by M; (iv) it is presupposed that within cs_c only in the worlds in which the kid has an exam tomorrow is q true ('↓'); and (v) all the worlds in the cs awaiting evaluation in which the kid has an exam tomorrow are worlds in which q is true (precisification).

Following the discussion above for Non-Res_{BIF}s, with q the proposition that the kid is going out to play, plainly applying the analysis in (46) in a cs_c in which all combinations are live would lead to the (implausible) conclusion that the mother's precisification of the kid's proposal encodes (conditional) dependencies in cs counter to presuppositions (e.g., that nothing is decided but learning that the kid has an exam leads to learning that the kid is going out, and, e.g., learning that the kid doesn't go out leads us to learning that the kid doesn't have an exam). This cannot be the interpretation. We are not willing to accept that a participant is considering an update in which cs encodes dependencies that we deem impossible, resulting in an absurd cs. The absurdity of the resulting cs is at the center of my proposal to explain BIF↓s as Res_{BIF}s.

Conflicts between background assumptions and *if*-constructions have already been observed and addressed in the literature on *biscuit conditionals* (BCs; e.g, *there are biscuits on the sideboard, if you want some*; Austin 1956). Pragmatic accounts of BCs (see, e.g., Franke 2009; Biezma and Goebel 2023) argue that *if*-constructions interpreted as BCs have the same semantics as those interpreted as hypothetical conditionals and derive the differences between the two readings from assumptions about the (conditional) dependence relation between protasis and apodosis: in BCs they are independent, i.e., we presuppose that the protasis being true has no bearing on the apodosis being true. E.g., in the BC above, we presuppose that learning that

you are hungry now cannot lead to learning whether or not there are biscuits on the sideboard. In BCs, starting with a *cs* in which all combinations are live, updating merely with the regular *if*-construction update in (49b) would result in an "absurd" ('magical') *cs*, (56i), in which our presuppositions about possible dependencies are violated: an absurd *cs* in which there may be biscuits or not, but learning that you are hungry would lead to learning that there are biscuits on the sideboard and, additionally, learning that there are no biscuits would lead to learning that you are not hungry. The proposal in Biezma and Goebel (2023) is that context updates should preserve our assumptions about (im)possible conditional dependencies between facts: facts that are presupposed to be (conditionally) independent (learning one has not bearing on learning about the other), should remain independent after updating the context. To accept the BC and update the context without violating our (in)dependence assumptions (e.g., to preserve independence between being hungry and there being biscuits) we need to figure out what further factual assumptions are made in *cs*. Thus, avoiding absurdity in updating the context with the BC (ruling (56-i) out) while maintaining the presuppositions triggered by *if*-constructions (ruling (56-ii) out), would force us to understand that the update proposed is one in which there are indeed biscuits on the sideboard whether you are hungry or not (i.e., there are no worlds in which there are no biscuits), (56-iii):

(56) If you are hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard.



(i) Absurd *cs* (being hungry and there being biscuits can't be dependent)

(ii) Indicative presupposition failure

(iii) Only *cs* possible given independence assumptions

How does this help with our Res_{BIF} in (54), where going out to play does not depend on having an exam (it would normally depend on not having one)?

(54) Kid: Mamá, me voy a jugar a la calle.
'Mom, I'm going out to play.'
Mom: Si tienes un examen mañana↓. [Res_{BIF}]
if have.2sg.IND a exam tomorrow
≈'Having an exam tomorrow?!'

As in the case of BCs, we reason about the interpretation, (57), to avoid going counter our presuppositions about (im)possible dependencies (i.e., an absurd *cs*). Importantly, if the upshot of the mother's BIF↓ in (54) were parallel to that in (51-iii), the result would be an absurd *cs* (the *cs* awaiting evaluation would encode that learning that the kid is going out leads to learning that they have an exam, while learning that they don't have an exam leads to learning

that they don't go out, 57-i). Notice also that on its own the exhaustivity presupposition in cs_c would also give rise to absurdity if all other options were live (learning that the kid doesn't have an exam would lead to learning that they don't go out, while learning that they go out would lead us to learning that they have an exam). Crucially, there must be worlds in which the kid goes out, since they are proposing that they do, and worlds in which they have an exam (indicative presupposition). The only possible cs_c against which the kid's proposal can be made is one in which the kid may go out or not, but it is presupposed that they have an exam (57-ii). Thus, the BIF↓ spells out that the (detailed) proposal awaiting evaluation is (57-iii).

(57) Let q be the proposition that the kid is going out to play and $[\![\phi]\!]$ that the kid has an exam tomorrow.



(i) A *cs* without gray area is not tenable (absurd *cs*)



(ii) Without gray area, not absurd cs_c compatible with kid's proposal and BIF↓



(iii) Update proposal spelled out by BIF↓ ($\mathrm{Res}_{\mathrm{BIF}}$)

In other words, the mother's clarification of the kid's proposal via the presuppositions associated with the utterance of a BIF↓ only makes sense if the initial context in which the kid made their proposal was one in which it was already presupposed that they had an exam. More generally, the utterance of a BIF↓ in which the prejacent and recovered apodosis are presupposed to be independent is only felicitous in a context in which the prejacent is presupposed.

With this in hand, let us see the BIF↓ in (54) at work, (58). The kid's utterance *seems* to simply propose to update the context with the proposition that they are going out to play, q, (58-i). However, the mother's BIF↓ raises awareness of what a q-update really means with respect to $[\![\phi]\!]$: with the BIF↓ in (54) the mother spells out that the kid is proposing that she accept that they are going out to play even though they have an exam, (58ii). This is an anomalous proposal, but the resulting *cs* is not absurd (it does not encode impossible dependencies).

(58) **$\mathrm{Res}_{\mathrm{BIF}}$ interpretation**: Where $[\![\phi]\!]$ is the prejacent of a BIF↓ and q the recovered apodosis s.t. a correlation between $[\![\phi]\!]$ and q defies our

(defeasible) assumptions of normalcy (Res_{BIF}).



(i) What the kid seems to be proposing

(ii) BIF↓: Mother's spell-out of kid's proposal with respect to $[\![\phi]\!]$

In sum, BIF↓s (either as Res_{BIF}s or Non-Res_{BIF}s) are only felicitous if the *cs* of evaluation does not have worlds in which the prejacent is not true and the apodosis is true ('↓'). Since Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s are both BIF↓s, in both cases we are told that accepting the previous move involves eliminating the worlds in which the prejacent is true and the apodosis is not; just as in the parallel *if*-construction. What makes the difference in whether BIF↓s are interpreted as Res_{BIF}s or Non-Res_{BIF}s are our assumptions of what dependencies can be encoded by *cs*. These assumptions are responsible for the felicity conditions uniquely associated with Res_{BIF}s, namely that cs_c lacks worlds in which the prejacent is not true. The upshot is that the exhaustivity condition associated with '↓' is 'masked' in Res_{BIF}s : worlds in which the prejacent and apodosis are false have been eliminated.

Our analysis captures differences in intuitions regarding the status of Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s as objections. Both Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s "repeat" the proposal awaiting evaluation while raising awareness of the proposal's properties. Repeating what someone just said is not a felicitous way of simply accepting the proposal. In fact, the default (explicit) acceptance would be a nod, 'ok' or something minimal. One can 'repeat' what was said to make a relevant point (e.g., *A: The kids are coming for lunch; B:* YOUR *kids are coming for lunch (so, you do the cooking)*). By raising awareness of relevant properties of the proposal awaiting evaluation, thus giving the addressee the chance to ponder them, the speaker is delaying evaluation. This is only possible if the speaker deems that acceptance/rejection depends on the properties highlighted. In the case of Non-Res_{BIF}s, the speaker points out that the proposal made can only be one that is conditioned by the status of the prejacent. In the case of Res_{BIF}s the speaker points out a correlation of facts. Pointing out a correlation of facts that affects the possibility of acceptance is only justified if it is considered as a potential impediment for acceptance. Overall, it is only possible if the correlation is taken to be anomalous. A further illustration is provided by the infelicity in (59):

(59) A: Tengo hambre.
have.1sg hunger
'I'm hungry.'
B: #Si hace sol↓.
if does sun

Assuming that A's hunger is presupposed to be independent of it being sunny, (59B) is infelicitous because we cannot recover how the correlation between A being hungry and it being sunny has any bearing on accepting that A is hungry ((59B) would only be felicitous in a context in which it is assumed that it being sunny normally correlates with A not being hungry instead of A being hungry). Given that independent BIF↓s serve to object by making prominent that the proposed correlation of facts runs against defeasible assumptions of normalcy (Res_{BIF}s), their utterance is often accompanied by 'surprise' prosodic features (see Elvira García et al. 2017). This is why it is common to see Res_{BIF}s paraphrased as exclamations by adding '?!' (as noted in §1).

The proposal offered above also explains differences between Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s regarding possible responses (see §3.1.3): responding to Res_{BIF}s by asserting the prejacent is infelicitous while it is fine with Non-Res_{BIF}s. Such a response to Res_{BIF}s would be redundant (it doesn't add anything to what the BIF↓ has already pointed out). However, in the case of Non-Res_{BIF}s, asserting the prejacent would provide the information that the prejacent is indeed true, resolving an open issue.

The upshot of our proposal is that Res_{BIF}s and Non-Res_{BIF}s do not have different semantics. Their differences depend on what conditional dependencies are presupposed to be possible. In the case of BIF↓s with independent prejacent and apodosis we find the same pattern that Biezma and Goebel (2023) observed for BCs: we reason about an interpretation to avoid going counter our presuppositions about (im)possible dependencies. From the case of BCs, we have learned that the priority is to avoid a *cs* that encodes conditional dependencies between facts that we presuppose are actually independent: we prefer to accept an additional premise rather than violate independence presuppositions. The case of BIF↓s further strengthens the lesson: we prefer to consider factual anomalies (e.g., that the kid is proposing to go out while having an exam) rather than violate our presuppositions about possible conditional dependencies.

4.3 Back to the original contrasts

Let us see now how the differences between Res_{BIF}s and adjunct *if*-clauses in (13) can be explained.

(13)

	adjunct *if*-clause	BIF↓(as Res_{BIF}s)
post-Nom NPI	✓	X
Coordination	✓	X
Embeddability	✓	X
Sentence-lev. adverb	✓	X

The first observation was that Res_{BIF}s do not accept postnominal NPIs. I claim that Spanish post-nominal NPIs, unlike pre-nominal, are not just NPIs but *minimizers* (strong NPIs; e.g., a suitable paraphrase for (5) above would include something along the line of "the slightest doubt"). (60) provides evidence for the characterization of postnominal NPIs as minimizers.

(60) Si tienes **#duda alguna** / **✓alguna** duda, me puedes
if have.2sg.IND doubt any / any doubt cl.1sg can.2sg.IND
llamar, pero no me llames con pequeñeces. Para esas
call.INF but neg cl.1sg call.2sg.SUBJ with little things for those
cosas está Chris.
things is.3sg Chris
'If you have #even the smallest/any doubt, you can call me, but don't call me with small things. Call Chris instead for those."

Postnominal NPIs are, hence, strong-NPIs. This is important because, as Heim (1984) points out, strong-NPIs are acceptable in *if*-constructions only if they align with our background assumptions. For example, the minimizer in (61) is odd if the speaker standardly assumes that reading newspapers increases informativity; it is good if we adopt the background assumption that reading newspapers decreases information).

(61) If you read any newspaper (#at all), you remain quite ignorant.
(Adapted from Heim 1984)

While explaining this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this paper it is clear that Res_{BIF}s align with (61). In the analysis argued for here, Res_{BIF}s are similar to *if*-constructions in which the interpretation runs against our background assumptions and, hence, it is predicted that minimizers are not possible in BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s.

We have also seen that BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s cannot be coordinated. It is important here to notice that to be interpreted as a Res_{BIF} the BIF requires '↓'. This contour is not possible after the first conjunct in conjoined *if*-clauses, which needs a '↑'. Notice that (8'), with *además* ('also'), more natural than plain *y* ('and') in sentence initial position, allows '↓' and the result if fine.

(8') ¡Si ha estudiado mucho↓! Además, ¡si lo sabe todo↓!
if has studied a lot also if cl.3sg.ACC knows all
'How can you say she's going to fail after how much she studied and knowing all the material?'

The problem is not then with stacking itself, but with the possibility of having '↓'.

Finally, the mere fact that Res_{BIF}s are not full sentences and they do not denote a proposition explains why they cannot be embedded (see (10)) and why they can't have sentential adverbs scoping over them (see (12)). This also explains why Res_{BIF}s do not accept sentential negation although the addressee can respond to them by saying that the prejacent is not true (see discussion in §2.2).

A question remains, why can we respond to a Res_{BIF} by challenging the truth of the prejacent? The overall interpretation of a Res_{BIF} is one in which the speaker is implicitly objecting to someone else's context update proposal by pointing out that all the worlds in the *cs* of evaluation in which the original

proposal would be accepted are such that the prejacent is true (e.g., that the context set in which it is accepted that the kid goes out to play is one in which the kid has an exam tomorrow). The challenger to the Res_{BIF} can reject that this is indeed the proposal they were making (they don't have an exam anymore! it got postponed!), but we rightly predict that it cannot be done via sentential negation.

At this point one could wonder whether the fact that the prejacent can be negated doesn't argue against the claim that BIF↓s only have definedness conditions. That is, on the one hand we have shown that BIF↓s only involve presuppositions regarding the update and its context, and also that they are not good direct answers to questions. All this supports the idea that they do not have at-issue content in the sense of Beaver et al. (2017). However, the prejacent can be negated, which is something that, in principle, one cannot do with not-at-issue content, as shown in (62) for appositives, the prototypical example of not-at-issueness.

(62) A: Who ordered stake for dinner yesterday?
B: Sam, who is vegetarian, ordered stake.
A: That's not true,
(i) #Sam is not vegetarian.
(ii) Sam didn't order stake.

Notice, however, that in scenarios similar to what we have seen with BIF↓s, the appositive's content can be negated:

(63) A: Who ordered stake for dinner yesterday?
B: Sam ordered stake.
A: [Sounding skeptical] Sam, who is vegetarian.
B: That's not true! Sam is not vegetarian.

A's repetition of B's answer with the precisification of Sam's properties comes across as an objection in manner parallel to the case of Res_{BIF}s. Though the content is offered by an appositive, in this kind of scenario, it can still be negated.

5 Conclusion

The proposal in this paper shows that by taking into consideration the relation of utterances within the running context-update we can explain subtle meanings without *ad-hoc* complications in the theoretical machinery. Below are some highlights of the analysis.

In terms of the broader agenda, we have seen that abstracting away from the sentence level and taking into consideration the dynamic update triggered by utterances in models that represent utterances as proposals, allows us to preserve the core interpretation of *if*-clauses as domain restrictors while deriving differences between BIF↓s as Non-Res_{BIF}s and as Res_{BIF}s. The flavors of interpretation of BIF↓s are the result of mechanisms that are already familiar.

The strengthening mechanism is the same as that observed in biscuit conditionals, and the exhaustification import of '↓' has also been independently motivated.

Since I show that all the interpretational characteristics of BIF↓s can be derived from an analysis of BIF↓s as (across-speaker) *if*-clauses in which '↓' matters, I don't need to stipulate ad-hoc semantics in any terminal to derive the desired overall meaning. This said, I do not offer arguments against an alternative analysis such as that advocated for by a reviewer in which we would have a multiplicity of *si*-s ('if's), the one in BIF↓s being a discourse particle (i.e., an element conveying information concerning the participants' epistemic states regarding the utterance's content). In such analysis, *si* in BIF↓s would encode, somehow, all that I take BIF↓s to convey just by virtue of being (across-speaker) *if*-clauses with '↓'. My only immediate objection to the 'ambiguity' analysis is a principled one, namely that stipulating lexical ambiguity should be a last resort. I believe the approach I take to be more explanatory regarding how speakers go about the interpretation of natural language utterances.

Spanish BIF↓s have previously been studied primarily as Res_{BIF}s and as an example of reanalysis (see, e.g., Schwenter 2016a,b), the final stage in a process that ends in *insubordination*, "the conventionalised main-clause use of what, on prima facie grounds, appear to be formally subordinate clauses" (Evans, 2007, pg. 367). Insubordinated *if*-clauses are also found in other languages, although they are usually used to convey polite requests (see Evans 2007, pg. 380), instead of, e.g., objections, as they can be in Spanish.[24] Insurbordinated clauses have been claimed to result from a historical change consisting of four stages (Evans, 2007): (i) subordination; (ii) ellipsis; (iii) conventionalized ellipsis; (iv) reanalysis as main clause structure. While I am not rejecting the idea that reanalysis is the right approach to detached *if*-clauses in other languages, one take-away from my proposal is that Spanish BIF↓s do not exhibit reanalysis (yet) and are thus not insubordinated clauses. However, although they have not undergone reanalysis (and become assertions), some conventionalization has taken place, allowing the apodosis to be recovered from the immediate

[24] It seems that Italian also has BIF↓s interpreted as Res_{BIF}s or Non-Res_{BIF}s (I thank Paolo Santorio for this observation; thanks also to Riccardo Pellegrini and Giorgio Sbardolini for offering Italian judgements):

(i) Kid: Vado in strada a giocare. (*I'm going out to play*)
  a. Parent: Ma se hai un esame domani. (Vai subito nella tua stanza!/A giocare?!/#(Non) puoi andare a giocare.).
     ≈ 'Having an exam tomorrow?! (Go back to your room!/'To play'?!/You can #(not) go out to play.)
  b. Parent: Se hai finito i compiti.
     'Only if you have finished your homework.'

(ia) is interpreted similarly to the Spanish parallel examples. One thing to notice is that in Italian *ma* ('but') is required. This is not true for all varieties of Spanish: it is required in Mexican but not, e.g., in Peninsular Spanish (see also ftn. 15). While there is no thorough prosodic analysis of Italian BIFs, they certainly do not present a final rise in the interpretation conveyed. A final rise is possible in (ib), but in this case, as in Spanish, we would interpret the *if*-clause as a not (necessarily) exhaustive "elliptical" hypothetical conditional (I am grateful to Y for the Italian prosodic observations). I leave for future research whether all claims made for Spanish also hold for Italian. Discussing account language-specific features that may or may not make the interpretations of these BIF↓s different is beyond the scope of this paper.

context. This could be a source of typological variation, with languages like Spanish (and possibly Italian) already in a 'conventionalized ellipsis' stage in historical evolution, allowing for the recovery of either a *dependent* or an *independent* apodosis, with other languages (such as English) still at an 'elliptical stage' requiring the recovered apodosis to be in a dependence relation with the prejacent, just as with '↑'. This may be why languages like English only allow for BIF↓s to be interpreted as Non-Res_{BIF}s. Other languages, however, may have already arrived at the reanalysis stage. We are not there yet in Spanish, and this paper shows that paying close attention to all the ingredients in the construction of meaning and abstracting away from the sentence level allows us to explain complex meanings without ad hoc complications in the system.

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